IRES Intelligence Platform (IIP)

IRES Intelligence Platform (IIP)

ANNUAL SURVEY PAPER 2024

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CHINA-U.S. RIVALRY

  • 30/09/2024

The China-US rivalry is essentially a geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the two countries. The rivalry could disrupt supply chains, leading to increased de-globalization, resurgent inflation and further instability in global value chains and markets.

The United States expanded its global political and economic power in the aftermath of World War II. By 1960, US GDP accounted for 60% of global GDP 1.

Back in the Cold War, China was in the Soviet camp, while the United States led the Western camp. China-US relations nevertheless normalized in 1979. China’s economic development continues unabated since then, notably following Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms of 1982, which gradually opened China up to global markets.

From the early 2000s onwards, the United States formalized trade relations with China under the U.S-China Relations Act 2, allowing the two countries to further expand trade.

As a result of its export-led economic policy, China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, surpassing Japan 3. China-US trade relations have since gradually grown strained, particularly under the Trump presidency.

The trade rivalry saw a recent US industrial policy decision to restrict technology exports, namely via the CHIPS Act 4, with the aim of preventing China from gaining access to American microprocessors.

Geopolitically, the rivalry transpires in part in the militarization of the South China Sea. The risk of open conflict remains low, however, given the economic interdependence of both countries.

Escalating China-U.S. rivalry creates challenges for developing and emerging countries, who need to work with both sides without antagonizing either.

Morocco, a traditional US ally, does not shy away from allying itself with major emerging powers, notably China, with which it established a strategic partnership in 2016. Morocco’s policy of diversifying alliances helps it keep pace of geopolitical changes in a volatile and uncertain world, while safeguarding its strategic autonomy and not aligning its foreign policy with a given foreign power when this does not serve its fundamental national interest.

The Kingdom should therefore continue to forge closer commercial ties with the United States, on the one hand, and with China and other emerging countries on the other, to safeguard supply chain stability and gain a prime position in global value chains.

COGNITIVE WARFARE

  • 30/09/2024

Cognitive warfare refers to the use of information as a weapon, to influence public opinion and, in turn, adversary institutions. NATO defines cognitive warfare as “the manipulation of public opinion, by an external entity, to influence public and government policies and destabilize public institutions”  5.

Information warfare was used in the Cold War as part of “psyops” (psychological warfare) operations, aimed at propagating information against the enemy on its territory. In recent years, the rise of cyberspace means information spreads across the globe in a matter of seconds, thereby magnifying the scale and impact of cognitive attacks  6.

A number of traditional and emerging powers, and even extremist movements, now use cognitive attacks to destabilize political, economic and social systems in target countries, by confusing public opinion 7.

Cognitive warfare is now a formidable weapon at the disposal of groups and countries seeking to destabilize a target country. It has therefore become essential to include cognitive warfare as a potential threat to a country.

Morocco, like other countries the world over, is not immune to the threat of cognitive warfare. To best tackle this emergence, the Kingdom should adopt a comprehensive approach: further enhance national cybersecurity resources; establish a framework for identifying cognitive warfare through clear definitions; implement educational policies focused on fact-checking, to limit the effect of media bias, thus protecting public opinion from misinformation.

Furthermore, close cooperation with GAFAMs, via partnerships, would be useful for controlling online content and, in turn, combating cognitive attacks 8.

COLLABORATIVE WARFARE

  • 03/09/2024

Collaborative warfare refers to the synchronization of digital systems and resources (Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Cloud, Data centers, etc.), military vehicles with embedded technologies (drones, tanks, fighter jets, etc.) and intelligence and information of all types, making them available for automatical and real-time military action. This means resources collaborate across multiple environments (land, air, sea, space, cyberspace) 9, as part of a centralized warfare system.

The U.S. Air Force already employs collaborative warfare extensively in theaters of operation.  There are plans to procure 1,000 support UAVs and implement a Combat Cloud for the new 6th-generation fighter jets built in the years ahead 10. The Scorpion program in France, launched in 2014, seeks to optimize communication within the army 11, while other programs, such as Liaison 16, Conect@Aero and Axon@V 12, provide inter-corps communication within the French Armed Forces.

Despite progress, collaborative warfare has yet to reach its full potential in the absence of a unified network, and efforts are underway to bring about full communication between all army corps.

At European Union level, Thales is developing the LATACC (Land Tactical Collaborative Combat) program, associating actors from 13 member states, and drawing on 49 million euros in funding from the European Commission. It aims to build a centralized warfare network between regional armed forces with a view to fostering more widespread collaborative warfare 13.

Collaborative warfare, dubbed the war of the future, enables seamless coordination of actions between forces in the field, as well as between different components of the armed forces. It is essential for armed forces wishing to secure a comparative battlefield edge over adversaries, minimizing uncertainty and increasing the precision of field operations.

Source: Ministry of the Armed Forces -France-. Army (2022). Presentation of the SCORPION program

In Morocco, Act 10-20 of July 14, 2020, on the Defense Industry, authorizes the development of a national defense industry within a robust legislative framework 14. This helps Morocco innovate, with centralized weapon systems and networks that combine human and digital resources, to be best equipped in the global race for collaborative warfare. This will enable the national defense system to better adapt to the handling of unfamiliar environments by leveraging data derived from sensors, thereby further illuminating decision-making processes and enhancing command functions.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)

  • 30/09/2024

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) refers to the deliberate (or imposed) incorporation by corporations of social, environmental and economic issues into their business operations and stakeholder relations and interactions.

CSR dates back to 1953, when US economist Howard Bowen – considered its founding father – published “Social Responsibilities of the Businessman”. By the late twentieth century, CSR began to establish itself progressively within US corporations.

CSR debates first emerged in Europe in the 1990s, alongside the “sustainability” and “durability” movements.

The concept was further developed in the wake of the 1992 Rio Conference 15, in a context of growing corporate awareness of social, economic and environmental issues.

CSR recently expanded in Europe to include governance (compliance with the law, transparency and ethics). ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) criteria were introduced as part of the Green Pact for Europe, in 2019. The same criteria have since been adopted in a number of African countries, particularly in the banking and financial sector.

By 2021, 88 nations reported adopting the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO 2600016 standard, which establishes CSR guidelines. A further 17 countries are in the process of adopting the standard, underscoring the growing importance of CSR worldwide.

Now seen as an essential strategic tool for companies, CSR open new markets, enhance brand image in the eyes of stakeholders and position businesses as socially responsible.

The United Nations Global Compact (Global Impact) 17calls on companies, associations and non-governmental organizations the world over to adopt socially and environmentally responsible attitudes, with a view to sustainable development and transparency.

The challenge is to transform CSR principles and/or ESG criteria into tangible actions that contribute to solving social, environmental, ethical and economic challenges facing human societies.

In Morocco, His Majesty King Mohammed VI urged businesses and investors back in 2005 to incorporate social responsibility objectives and indicators into their strategies 18.

Public authorities and the private sector have taken a number of steps in this direction, such as defining a CSR Charter for the Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM) 19 and introducing a CSR label scheme in 2007.

By 2024, a total 124 companies held the CGEM CSR certification 20, demonstrating their commitment to meeting social and environmental criteria. CSR adoption, however, is still held-back by persistent challenges, notably difficulties in effectively implementing these criteria, that need to be remedied through awareness-raising campaigns, incentives and support measures.

CYBERWARFARE

  • 30/09/2024

Cyberwarfare refers to the disruption of information systems by cyberattacks targeting military, civilian and/or technological objectives 21.

Arguably the first cyber attack occurred in 1986, when East Germany targeted MILNET 22 to access to confidential information 23.

Digital technology expansion and the growth of the Internet, have created an ever- expanding, and consequently increasingly vulnerable, cyberspace. The cost of cyberattacks went from $3,000 billion to $8,400 billion in 2015-2022 24.

The Ukraine war is a particularly vivid example of the stakes attached to cyberwarfare worldwide. Ukrainians have to deal with a host of everyday problems arising from cyberattacks. They sometimes lose access to ATMs, the Internet and even electricity 25.

State and non-state actors alike use information as a form of cyber warfare, manipulating public opinion via fake news, bots and troll factories 26.

Cyberwarfare is increasingly employed as a means of destabilizing adversaries or perpetrating fraud. This is fueled by the ubiquitous Internet, everywhere. As a result, governments and businesses alike have a duty to develop cybersecurity systems to guard against cyberattacks and protect their information systems 27.

Recognizing the importance of protecting information systems, Morocco initiated a cybersecurity strategy in 2011, and created the Direction Générale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (General Directorate of Information Systems Security) in the same year, tasked with analyzing, auditing, monitoring, controlling and advising on information systems, and with regulatory oversight.

Despite the Kingdom’s efforts in this area, its’ information systems faced at least 52 million cyberattacks in 2023, according to international cybersecurity consultancy Trend Micro Incorporated 28. To guard against the proliferation of such attacks, the General Directorate of Information Systems Security (DGSSI) unveiled its new national cybersecurity strategy for 2030 in July 2024. 29.

Implementation should reflect current technological advances. Particular attention should be paid, in parallel, to the training of human capital and R&D to stay up to date in the field of cybersecurity.

DIGITAL PRIVACY

  • 30/09/2024

Digital privacy encompasses steps to protect personal data30 from unauthorized access, breaches of confidentiality and abuse in cyberspace 31.

The emergence of digital technologies and the growing use of social networks and online platforms have given rise to significant concerns regarding digital privacy. This digital exponential growthhas enabled tech giants to develop business models predicated on the mass collection and analysis of personal information.

Greater utilization of personal data inevitably results in misuse, as exemplified in the Cambridge Analytica  32 and Pegasus spyware 33 scandals, highlighting the importance of protecting digital privacy. 

Breach of privacy potentially leads to serious consequences, including identity theft, reputational damage, online harassment and manipulation of public opinion.

Additionally, emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and Big Data analysis blur the boundaries between online and offline prejudice, with ever more powerful algorithms progressively taking control of web user privacy, with no consent from the user, who is often ill-informed of such practices.

The key is to strike a proper balance between innovative digital applications and safeguarding individual privacy rights, while investing in infrastructure and education to harness the full potential of Big Data in an ethical and secure way.

Recognizing the importance of this emergence, Morocco established the Commission Nationale de Contrôle de la Protection des Données à Caractère Personnel (CNDP) in 2009. This Commission is charged with ensuring “respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 34.

The CNDP is also charged with informing economic operators of the rules and mechanisms governing the transfer of personal data abroad.

The Commission also provides “legal and technological intelligence.  It tracks, studies and analyzes technological, economic, legal and societal trends and changes that may impact personal data protection in Morocco” 35.

The issue of national data protection is further fleshed out in a number of legal and regulatory frameworks, notably Law 09-08* on the protection of personal data.

INCREASING INFLUENCE OF MNCS IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

  • 30/09/2024

The growing influence of large corporations refers to the steady ascendancy of multinationals over states and other non-governmental players in the global governance system.

Global numbers of multinationals soared from 7,000 in 1972 36 to over 145,000 according to most recent European statistical business registers 37. Apple, for example, reported revenues ($383 billion) greater than Portugal’s GDP in 2022 38.

Multinationals today operate across multiple jurisdictions, so that they can design, register Intellectual Property and sell in developed economies, while at the same time opting for low-tax or low- production-cost countries to circumvent unfavorable multilateral, regional or local regulations 39.

Transnational corporations’ ability to directly invest and create jobs and economic growth gives them considerable leverage over countries. They can also influence intergovernmental organizations indirectly, by lobbying governments.

Multinationals are not, however, omnipotent players in global governance. NGOs and civic organizations can damage the interests of multinationals through activism (boycott campaigns, demonstrations, damage to reputation, etc.).

In 2009, Morocco signed the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, making it easier for MNCs to do business in the country 40.

The growing influence of MNCs requires national authorities to adjust public policies and investment magnet strategies, to tap into the huge technological and direct investment potential of large MNCs, while controlling the negative impacts they can have on the national economic fabric and public finances.

MULTIPLEX WORLD

  • 30/09/2024

The concept of a multiplex world, introduced by Amitav Acharya in his work “The End of American World Order“, refers to a world where various actors play their own games in parallel on different world stages. It can be seen in the gradual replacement of Western hegemony and a substantial rise in regionalism in many parts of the world.

This new world, increasingly decentralized and favoring cooperation around recognized regional powers, seeks regional solutions attuned to local realities, in a spirit of open, shared leadership.

Acharya uses a country’s “capacity to interact” 41 to show how the world is increasingly multiplex. Between 1945 and 2000, the United States took part in 40% of all new treaties signed, whereas from 2006 to 2017, this share fell to 22% 42, attesting to the emergence of new international cooperation frameworks.

In this multiplex world, international relations are no longer limited to a simple balance of power between great powers. On the contrary, multiple influential players now emerge, ranging from nation-states to multinationals, NGOs, social movements and even terrorist groups.

This diversity of geopolitical actors is transforming global power and influence dynamics.

One key feature of this multiplex world is a growing interdependence between nations. Global challenges such as climate change, pandemics and economic crises require collective responses, making multilateral cooperation indispensable. For example, the management of water resources and migration requires countries to work together, even in the face of political friction.

A multiplex world also brings opportunities. It drives innovation and creativity in solving global problems. Digital platforms, for example, enable ideas and best practices to spread quickly, fostering collaboration between a variety of players. The multiplex world is now a fact for every country.

However, the trend towards a multiplex world poses significant challenges to the smooth functioning of international cooperation. Complex international relations give rise to conflicts of interest, making decision-making more difficult. Also, the rise of nationalism and populism in many countries makes international cooperation more problematic, as governments often prioritize national agendas to the detriment of a collective approach.

Morocco is at a strategic crossroads in this complex world. The country has developed a proactive diplomacy, forging relations with a range of global powers, including the European Union, China and the United States. This openness lets the Kingdom play a mediation role in regional crises as well as strengthening its alliances.

Morocco also faces global challenges such as climate change and migration, which require concerted responses. It took significant initiatives, particularly at the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP22) in Marrakech and at the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, where it called for global action on the environment and migration.

In terms of the economy, Morocco strives to broaden partnership ties and enhance its attractiveness as a hub for investment in Africa and as a gateway to Europe. Free-trade agreements and infrastructure upgrades attest to Morocco’s determination to fully integrate the global economic fabric.

In fact, under the inspired vision of His Majesty King Mohammed VI, may God Assist him, the Kingdom has pursued an African policy that has seen a surge in the number of political, economic and trade agreements signed with African countries (over 1,000 in the last twenty years) 43. And so, with these multiple accords in place, Morocco already occupies a prominent place in this multiplex world.

The Royal Initiative for Atlantic Africa, a prime example of successful regionalism, is part of this same strategy of stepping up Morocco’s economic integration with the rest of Africa. It seeks to promote shared prosperity between Atlantic and Sahelian African countries. It consolidates the Kingdom’s position as a regional geostrategic leader in an increasingly complex world.

RENEWED MILITARY SPENDING

  • 30/09/2024

According to US think tank “International Institute for Strategic Studies”, military spending is seeing a global resurgence today. Global defense expenditure rose 9% from the 2019-2022 period in 2023  44, and is set to continue climbing in 2024. This trend stems from the proliferation of zones of instability and armed conflict across a number of regions.

Several countries, notably NATO members, have increased defense budgets in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The United States, for example, raised its military spending by 2.3% from 2022, to over $900 billion in 2023 45.

In Europe, Germany intends to increase its military budget by 0.5% of GDP to reach the 2% target set by NATO 46. France plans to allocate a total of €413 billion to defense by 2030, the biggest increase in 60 years 47, while Poland plans to devote over 4% of GDP to military defense by 2024 48.

Asia, meanwhile, set a record in 2023 with over $510 billion invested in defense, a surge mainly driven by the militarization of the South China Sea. In March 2023, China increased defense spending by 7.2% from 2022 49. Meanwhile, in August 2024, Taiwan earmarked $19.1 billion (3% of GDP) for its defense budget, the highest in its history 50.

These increases in arms budgets could destabilize more world regions and lead to more direct conflict.

Source: Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Morocco allocates between 3% and 4% of GDP to defense. Spending is driven by a need to continue upgrading and enhancing military capabilities, defend territorial integrity and counter potential threats in an unstable regional context. It is worth noting that, in line with a new strategic sovereignty paradigm, the Kingdom recently embarked on the development of a military and defense industry.

REFERENCES

  1. The World Bank Group [Online]. (2024): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1972&locations=1W-US&start=1960&view=chart.
  2. H.R.4444 - 106th Congress (1999-2000): To authorize extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. (2000, octobre 10). https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4444
  3. Lippit, V. D., Baiman, R., Kotz, D., Larudee, M., Li, M., Lippit, V., & Osterreich, S. (2011). Introduction: China’s Rise in the Global Economy. Review of Radical Political Economics, 43(1), 5-8. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613410385445
  4. H.R.4346 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): CHIPS and Science Act. (2022, août 9). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346
  5. Alonso Bernal Cameron Carter, Ishpreet Singh, Kathy Cao, Olivia Madreperla John Hopkins University, NATO – OTAN / JOHNS HOPKINS University. (2020), FALL 2020 COGNITIVE WARFARE. An attack on truth and thought report.
  6. Israel Public Policy Institute. Disinformation in the Digital Public Sphere (2024). https://www.ippi.org.il/fellowship/disinformation/
  7. Idem.
  8. IRES. (Octobre 2020), Etude "Réseaux sociaux au Maroc : enjeux et perspectives".
  9. Thales Group. (2024), article “ Collaborative Combat | Thales Group ’’ Consulté le 1er octobre 2024 à partir de : Collaborative Combat | Thales Group.
  10. Kiser, A., Hess, J., Bouhafa, E. M., & Williams, S. (2017), The combat cloud: enabling multi-domain command and control across the range of military operations. Air Command and Staff College: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wf_0065_hess_combat_cloud.pdf
  11. Margaux Bourgasser, F. A. (2022). Le COMBAT COLLABORATIF, COMBAT du FUTUR ? Consulté le 04 23, 2024, sur : https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ministere-armees/esprit-defense-numero-5-automne-2022-dossier-combat-collaboratif-combat-du-futur.pdf
  12. "Liaison 16" permet aux Rafales 4 de communiquer avec différents corps de l’armée dans le champ de bataille. Programme qui lie l’armée de l’air et l’armée de terre française. "Conect@Aero" permet la connectivité des acteurs de l’armée de l’air française. "Axon@V" permet la connectivité des acteurs de la marine nationale française.
  13. Thales. (2024) The Land Tactical Collaborative Combat (LATACC) project accelerates the introduction of collaborative combat by European coalition forces. Consulted on October 9, 2024. https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence/press_release/land-tactical-collaborative-combat-latacc-project-accelerates
  14. Bulletin Officiel Dahir n° 1-20-70 du 4 hija 1441 (25 juillet 2020) portant promulgation de la loi n° 10-20 relative aux matériels et équipements de défense et de sécurité, aux armes et aux munitions. [Online]. 
  15. Nations Unies. Conférence des Nations Unies. L’environnement et le développement, du 9 juin au 14 juin 1992 | Rio de Janeiro.
  16. ISO 26000. (2024), article “how to contribute to sustainable development’’ https://iso26000.info/.
  17. Pacte Mondial- Réseau France. (2024), article “Le Pacte mondial des Nations Unies, une initiative unique pour accompagner la transformation durable des entreprises’’. Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 :Pacte mondial des Nations Unies & pacte mondial ONU
  18. Extrait du Message de Sa Majesté Le Roi à la troisième édition des Intégrales de l’investissement ; Royaume du Maroc, 2005 : "La responsabilité sociale des investisseurs a pour pendant et pour condition la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. À cet égard, nous suivons avec intérêt et satisfaction l’action des entreprises marocaines qui se sont volontairement engagées dans cette voie"
  19. Charte de la CGEM Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises.
  20. Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM). (2024), Article de la commission RSE et diversité "La CGEM réitère son engagement vis à vis de la promotion de la RSE, notamment auprès des PME". Consulté le 02 Octobre 2024.
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  22. Intranet du Département de la Défense des Etats-Unis.
  23. Clifford Stoll. 1988. Stalking the wily hacker. Commun. ACM 31, 5 (May 1988), 484–497. https://doi.org/10.1145/42411.42412.
  24. World Economic Forum. Forum Institutional. (2024), article “2023 was a big year for cybercrime – here’s how we can make our systems safer’’ Consulted on October 1, 2024. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/cybersecurity-cybercrime-system-safety/.
  25. The European Parliament. (2023), Workshop Requested by the SEDE subcommittee “The role of cyber in the Russian war against Ukraine: Its impact and the consequences for the future of armed conflict’’. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/702594/EXPO_BRI(2023)702594_EN.pdf.
  26. NATO. Defense Education Enhancement Programme (2024), (DEEP) MEDIA – (DIS)INFORMATION – SECURITY 02, 15,2024. 
  27. World Bank. 2019. Global Cybersecurity Capacity Program. © World Bank.
  28. GITEX Africa. (2023), Press release “Trend Micro's 2023 Cybersecurity Report: Safeguarding Morocco's Digital Frontiers with Detection of 52 million Threats’’
  29. Direction Générale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information. Stratégie Nationale de Cybersécurité 2030. Juillet 2024.
  30. Ces données peuvent inclure des informations telles que les noms, les adresses, les numéros de téléphone, les coordonnées bancaires et transactions financières, les historiques de navigation, ….
  31. Nations Unies- Droits de l’Homme ; Haut-commissariat. Article “Le HCDH et le droit à la vie privée à l’ère du numérique | OHCHR’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024.
  32. Cyber Management School. (2024), article “Que se cache-t-il derrière le scandale Cambridge Analytica ?’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 sur : https://www.cyber-management-school.com/ecole/les-fondamentaux-de-la-cybersecurite/quest-ce-que-le-scandale-cambridge-analytica/
  33. Cyber Management School. (2024), article “Qu’est ce que le logiciel Pegasus ?’’. Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 sur : https://www.cyber-management-school.com/outils-logiciels-et-technologies/quest-ce-que-le-logiciel-pegasus/
  34. La Commission Nationale de contrôle de la protection des Données à caractère Personnel (CNDP).
  35. Idem.
  36. Qiang, Christine Zhenwei; Liu, Yan; Steenbergen, Victor. 2021. An Investment Perspective on Global Value Chains. © Washington, DC: World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35526 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  37. Eurostat. Statistics explained. (2024) "Structure of multinational enterprise groups in the EU". Consulté le 08 octobre 2024 : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Structure_of_multinational_enterprise_groups_in_the_EU
  38. The World Bank Group [Online]. - 02 14, 2024. – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=PT
  39. Cohen, S. D. (2007). Multinational corporations and foreign direct investment: avoiding simplicity, embracing complexity. Oxford University Press. ISBN : 139780195179354.
  40. OECD (2010), OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Morocco 2010, OECD Investment Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264079618-en.
  41. Pour Acharya, la ‘capacité d’interaction’ est l’indicateur primaire qui permet de mesurer le monde multiplexe. Elle se définit comme le stock et l’intensité d’accords ou de traités qu’un pays à avec le reste du monde.
  42. Acharya, A., Estevadeordal, A., & Goodman, L. W. (2023). Multipolar or multiplex? Interaction capacity, global cooperation and world order. International Affairs, 99(6), 2339-2365. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad242.
  43. IRES (2019). Rapport sur les Relations Internationales du Royaume / Chapitre IV- le Maroc et le Continent Africain. https://www.ires.ma/iip/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/RS-Relations-internationales-ACTUALISE-9-8-2019-Chapitre-4.pdf
  44. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024), article “The Military Balance 2024 spotlights an era of global insecurity’’ consulted online on October 02, 2024: https://www.iiss.org/press/2024/02/the-military-balance-2024-press-release/.
  45. Nan. T., Diego L., Xiao L., Lorenzo S. (2024), Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). https://doi.org/10.55163/BQGA2180
  46. RAND. (2024), article “Germany's New Plans for Transforming Its Defence and Foreign Policy Are Bold., They Are Also Running Into Familiar Problems’’ consulted online on October 02, 2024 : Germany's New Plans for Transforming Its Defence and Foreign Policy Are Bold. They Are Also Running Into Familiar Problems | RAND
  47. Institut des hautes études de défense nationale. (2023), article sur “Economie de guerre: comment la france s'adape à la haute intensité’’. Consulté le 02 Octobre 2024 Économie de guerre : comment la France s'adapte à la haute intensité ? - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale
  48. Paul Jones. The Center for European Policy Analysis. (2023), article “Poland Becomes a Defense Colossus ’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 : Poland Becomes a Defense Colossus - CEPA.
  49. International Institute for Stragegic Studies. (2024), Military blog, article “Asian defence spending ambitions outstrip growth’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 : Asian defence spending ambitions outstrip growth (iiss.org)
  50. Idem.
  1. The World Bank Group [Online]. (2024): https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1972&locations=1W-US&start=1960&view=chart.
  2. H.R.4444 - 106th Congress (1999-2000): To authorize extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (normal trade relations treatment) to the People's Republic of China, and to establish a framework for relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. (2000, octobre 10). https://www.congress.gov/bill/106th-congress/house-bill/4444
  3. Lippit, V. D., Baiman, R., Kotz, D., Larudee, M., Li, M., Lippit, V., & Osterreich, S. (2011). Introduction: China’s Rise in the Global Economy. Review of Radical Political Economics, 43(1), 5-8. https://doi.org/10.1177/0486613410385445
  4. H.R.4346 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): CHIPS and Science Act. (2022, août 9). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346
  5. Alonso Bernal Cameron Carter, Ishpreet Singh, Kathy Cao, Olivia Madreperla John Hopkins University, NATO – OTAN / JOHNS HOPKINS University. (2020), FALL 2020 COGNITIVE WARFARE. An attack on truth and thought report.
  6. Israel Public Policy Institute. Disinformation in the Digital Public Sphere (2024). https://www.ippi.org.il/fellowship/disinformation/
  7. Idem.
  8. IRES. (Octobre 2020), Etude "Réseaux sociaux au Maroc : enjeux et perspectives".
  9. Thales Group. (2024), article “ Collaborative Combat | Thales Group ’’ Consulté le 1er octobre 2024 à partir de : Collaborative Combat | Thales Group.
  10. Kiser, A., Hess, J., Bouhafa, E. M., & Williams, S. (2017), The combat cloud: enabling multi-domain command and control across the range of military operations. Air Command and Staff College: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wf_0065_hess_combat_cloud.pdf
  11. Margaux Bourgasser, F. A. (2022). Le COMBAT COLLABORATIF, COMBAT du FUTUR ? Consulté le 04 23, 2024, sur : https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ministere-armees/esprit-defense-numero-5-automne-2022-dossier-combat-collaboratif-combat-du-futur.pdf
  12. "Liaison 16" permet aux Rafales 4 de communiquer avec différents corps de l’armée dans le champ de bataille. Programme qui lie l’armée de l’air et l’armée de terre française. "Conect@Aero" permet la connectivité des acteurs de l’armée de l’air française. "Axon@V" permet la connectivité des acteurs de la marine nationale française.
  13. Thales. (2024) The Land Tactical Collaborative Combat (LATACC) project accelerates the introduction of collaborative combat by European coalition forces. Consulted on October 9, 2024. https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence/press_release/land-tactical-collaborative-combat-latacc-project-accelerates
  14. Bulletin Officiel Dahir n° 1-20-70 du 4 hija 1441 (25 juillet 2020) portant promulgation de la loi n° 10-20 relative aux matériels et équipements de défense et de sécurité, aux armes et aux munitions. [Online]. 
  15. Nations Unies. Conférence des Nations Unies. L’environnement et le développement, du 9 juin au 14 juin 1992 | Rio de Janeiro.
  16. ISO 26000. (2024), article “how to contribute to sustainable development’’ https://iso26000.info/.
  17. Pacte Mondial- Réseau France. (2024), article “Le Pacte mondial des Nations Unies, une initiative unique pour accompagner la transformation durable des entreprises’’. Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 :Pacte mondial des Nations Unies & pacte mondial ONU
  18. Extrait du Message de Sa Majesté Le Roi à la troisième édition des Intégrales de l’investissement ; Royaume du Maroc, 2005 : "La responsabilité sociale des investisseurs a pour pendant et pour condition la responsabilité sociale des entreprises. À cet égard, nous suivons avec intérêt et satisfaction l’action des entreprises marocaines qui se sont volontairement engagées dans cette voie"
  19. Charte de la CGEM Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises.
  20. Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM). (2024), Article de la commission RSE et diversité "La CGEM réitère son engagement vis à vis de la promotion de la RSE, notamment auprès des PME". Consulté le 02 Octobre 2024.
  21. LUIGGI, J (2016). Cyberguerre, nouveau visage de la guerre ? Stratégique, 2016/2 N° 112. pp. 91-100. https://doi.org/10.3917/strat.112.0091.
  22. Intranet du Département de la Défense des Etats-Unis.
  23. Clifford Stoll. 1988. Stalking the wily hacker. Commun. ACM 31, 5 (May 1988), 484–497. https://doi.org/10.1145/42411.42412.
  24. World Economic Forum. Forum Institutional. (2024), article “2023 was a big year for cybercrime – here’s how we can make our systems safer’’ Consulted on October 1, 2024. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/cybersecurity-cybercrime-system-safety/.
  25. The European Parliament. (2023), Workshop Requested by the SEDE subcommittee “The role of cyber in the Russian war against Ukraine: Its impact and the consequences for the future of armed conflict’’. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2023/702594/EXPO_BRI(2023)702594_EN.pdf.
  26. NATO. Defense Education Enhancement Programme (2024), (DEEP) MEDIA – (DIS)INFORMATION – SECURITY 02, 15,2024. 
  27. World Bank. 2019. Global Cybersecurity Capacity Program. © World Bank.
  28. GITEX Africa. (2023), Press release “Trend Micro's 2023 Cybersecurity Report: Safeguarding Morocco's Digital Frontiers with Detection of 52 million Threats’’
  29. Direction Générale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information. Stratégie Nationale de Cybersécurité 2030. Juillet 2024.
  30. Ces données peuvent inclure des informations telles que les noms, les adresses, les numéros de téléphone, les coordonnées bancaires et transactions financières, les historiques de navigation, ….
  31. Nations Unies- Droits de l’Homme ; Haut-commissariat. Article “Le HCDH et le droit à la vie privée à l’ère du numérique | OHCHR’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024.
  32. Cyber Management School. (2024), article “Que se cache-t-il derrière le scandale Cambridge Analytica ?’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 sur : https://www.cyber-management-school.com/ecole/les-fondamentaux-de-la-cybersecurite/quest-ce-que-le-scandale-cambridge-analytica/
  33. Cyber Management School. (2024), article “Qu’est ce que le logiciel Pegasus ?’’. Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 sur : https://www.cyber-management-school.com/outils-logiciels-et-technologies/quest-ce-que-le-logiciel-pegasus/
  34. La Commission Nationale de contrôle de la protection des Données à caractère Personnel (CNDP).
  35. Idem.
  36. Qiang, Christine Zhenwei; Liu, Yan; Steenbergen, Victor. 2021. An Investment Perspective on Global Value Chains. © Washington, DC: World Bank. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35526 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
  37. Eurostat. Statistics explained. (2024) "Structure of multinational enterprise groups in the EU". Consulté le 08 octobre 2024 : https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Structure_of_multinational_enterprise_groups_in_the_EU
  38. The World Bank Group [Online]. - 02 14, 2024. – https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=PT
  39. Cohen, S. D. (2007). Multinational corporations and foreign direct investment: avoiding simplicity, embracing complexity. Oxford University Press. ISBN : 139780195179354.
  40. OECD (2010), OECD Investment Policy Reviews: Morocco 2010, OECD Investment Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264079618-en.
  41. Pour Acharya, la ‘capacité d’interaction’ est l’indicateur primaire qui permet de mesurer le monde multiplexe. Elle se définit comme le stock et l’intensité d’accords ou de traités qu’un pays à avec le reste du monde.
  42. Acharya, A., Estevadeordal, A., & Goodman, L. W. (2023). Multipolar or multiplex? Interaction capacity, global cooperation and world order. International Affairs, 99(6), 2339-2365. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad242.
  43. IRES (2019). Rapport sur les Relations Internationales du Royaume / Chapitre IV- le Maroc et le Continent Africain. https://www.ires.ma/iip/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/RS-Relations-internationales-ACTUALISE-9-8-2019-Chapitre-4.pdf
  44. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2024), article “The Military Balance 2024 spotlights an era of global insecurity’’ consulted online on October 02, 2024: https://www.iiss.org/press/2024/02/the-military-balance-2024-press-release/.
  45. Nan. T., Diego L., Xiao L., Lorenzo S. (2024), Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). https://doi.org/10.55163/BQGA2180
  46. RAND. (2024), article “Germany's New Plans for Transforming Its Defence and Foreign Policy Are Bold., They Are Also Running Into Familiar Problems’’ consulted online on October 02, 2024 : Germany's New Plans for Transforming Its Defence and Foreign Policy Are Bold. They Are Also Running Into Familiar Problems | RAND
  47. Institut des hautes études de défense nationale. (2023), article sur “Economie de guerre: comment la france s'adape à la haute intensité’’. Consulté le 02 Octobre 2024 Économie de guerre : comment la France s'adapte à la haute intensité ? - L'IHEDN : Institut des hautes études de défense nationale
  48. Paul Jones. The Center for European Policy Analysis. (2023), article “Poland Becomes a Defense Colossus ’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 : Poland Becomes a Defense Colossus - CEPA.
  49. International Institute for Stragegic Studies. (2024), Military blog, article “Asian defence spending ambitions outstrip growth’’ Consulté le 02 octobre 2024 : Asian defence spending ambitions outstrip growth (iiss.org)
  50. Idem.