



Migration from Africa to Italy: Trends and policy responses

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issues, challenges and response strategies"

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Outline

- I. Key trends in African migration to Italy
- II. 2011 as a turning point
- III. European policy responses to the 2015-2016 “refugee crisis” and implications for African migration
- IV. The challenges ahead of us

African migration in a “new” immigration country: **key trends**


- Contrary to other major European destinations, African migration to Italy started in the late 1970s and 1980s, in a largely post-industrial and not immediately post-colonial context
- During the 1990s and early 2000s, Italy experienced massive inflows of demand-driven labour migration...
- ... BUT the political transition in Eastern Europe and the process of EU enlargement facilitated intra-European migration, while legal avenues for African migration were radically reduced

2011: What changed and what didn't

- Pre-2011: The key role of Khaddafi's Libya in European external migration strategies
- Immediate and medium-term impact of 2011 conflict in Libya
- Since 2013, major surge in "mixed flows", but migration geography not radically transformed: continuities and discontinuities in migration systems (Nigeria vs. Guinea)

Migrants arrived (apprehended/rescued) in Italy (2009-2016)

(Source: Min. Interior)




Dead and missing migrants (Central Med- route, 2009-2016)

(Sources: Fortress Europe until 2013, IOM 2014-2016)



**West Africa as
main source of
irregular arrivals
to the EU in 2017**



Source: Frontex

European policy responses and implications for African migration

- Failure of attempts at dealing with the crisis through internal redistribution of asylum seekers
- Increasing (but asymmetrical) prioritization of external responses (containment and prevention)
- **Three geopolitical axes** of this external strategy:
 - Turkey and “Balkan route”: the “statement” of March 2016
 - Priority sending/transit countries in SSA: Partnership Framework of June 2016 + Trust Fund
 - Central Mediterranean Route and upgrade of cooperation with/in Libya (particularly since summer 2017)


Specificity of the situation along the 'Central Mediterranean route'

- Flows along Central Med Route: **low recognition rates**, at best forms of humanitarian protection
 - BUT also **low return rate**
- Large-scale exclusion + growing public hostility


Great variations in flows composition

(1st instance decisions, 2017 Q2 – Source: Eurostat)


Germany (165 265 decisions)




France (27 105 decisions)




Italy (19 160 decisions)




Austria (14 160 decisions)



Sweden (13 435 decisions)




UK (6 435 decisions)



Refugee status Subsidiary protection Humanitarian reasons Rejections

High inflows + low recognition rates + low return rates = **Growing public anxiety**

Are immigrants a threat for public order and security?
(Source: Demos & Pi 2017)



3 key challenges ahead of us

- Reconciling migrants' fundamental rights and European migration control concerns, starting from Libya
- Channeling massive investments (together with political and intellectual resources) in large-scale and long-term strategies to reduce pressure on irregular channels by creating opportunities in loco
- Not bending to undifferentiated negative perceptions of migration and migrants, committing to a long-term cultural and political struggle to expand channels of legal mobility and migration within and across our two continents

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Thank you!